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Abstract
In this paper the machinery of Hybrid Logic and the logic of public announcements are merged. In order to
bring the two logics together properly the underlying hybrid logic has been changed such that nominals only
partially denote states. The hybrid logic contains nominals, satisfaction operators, the downarrow binder
as well as the global modality. Following this, an axiom system for the Hybrid Public Announcement Logic
is presented and using reduction axioms general completeness (in the usual style of Hybrid Logic) is proved.
The general completeness allows for an easy way of adding distributed knowledge. Furthermore, it turns
out that distributed knowledge is deﬁnable using satisfaction operators and the downarrow binder.
Keywords: Hybrid Logic, Public Announcement Logic, Distributed Knowledge, Completeness, Reduction
Axioms, Epistemic Logic.
1 Introduction
When Arthur Prior introduced Hybrid Logic, it was in the context of temporal
logics (see [3]), and since then several applications in temporal logics have been
found for Hybrid Logic ([5]). However, Hybrid Logic can be viewed as an extension
of any kind of modal logic, such as Epistemic Logic. Thus, it is a natural step to
extend Epistemic Logic to a hybrid version, but this step has rarely been taken.
This paper remedies this insuﬃciency.
A recent trend in Epistemic Logic is to model the dynamics of knowledge. There
are several ways of doing this, and Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is one type that
1 This paper has occurred in many draft versions and several people have commented on various versions
among others Olivier Roy, Jiahong Guo, Mai Ajspur, and Sine Zambach. The participants of the ILLC
seminar on Logics for Dynamics of Information and Preferences 2009, the HYLOCORE 2009 workshop,
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has received increased attention (see for instance the textbook [16]). The simplest
fragment of DEL is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), which adds modalities for
the action of public announcement to epistemic logic. The main concern of this
paper is to combine PAL with Hybrid Logic.
PAL is obtained by adding modalities of the form [ϕ] (for all formulas ϕ of the
language) to the language of Epistemic Logic. The reading of the formula [ϕ]ψ is
“after public announcement of ϕ, ψ is true” and the semantics specify that [ϕ]ψ is
true in a state in a model if, and only if, ψ true at that state in the submodel obtained
by restricting the domain to states where ϕ is true. A central part of Hybrid
Logic is the nominals, which are special propositional variables that are interpreted
as only being true in one state. In this way we can name and refer to speciﬁc
states of a model. When combining PAL with Hybrid Logic the immediate problem
is that when moving to submodels the states that some nominals name/denote
might be removed, and thus conﬂict with the requirement that nominals must be
true in exactly one state. This problem can be overcome by only letting nominals
partially denote states. General completeness results from Hybrid Logic can then be
transferred to PAL. A by-product of this is a straightforward way of adding modal
operators such as distributed knowledge to the logic.
Besides this paper, only a handful of other contributions appear to exist on com-
bining Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Hybrid Logic. In the paper [13] all epistemic
actions (of full DEL) are internalized. This is done by adding the epistemic actions
to the domain of the models, on the same level as epistemic states, and then use
a hybrid language to refer to them. However, in the process of modeling epistemic
scenarios this may result in a blow-up of the models, which must now also contain
the epistemic actions. This is not in line with the usual way of using Kripke mod-
els, where the states represent diﬀerent ways the world might be or diﬀerent states
a system might be in. In [12] a public announcement logic with nominals, global
modality, modalities for intentions and preferences is introduced. In that paper, to
deal with the interplay between nominals and the public announcement operators,
the truth condition for nominals is only changed in the updated models. Thus the
updated models are not genuine models for the language. We deal with this deﬁ-
ciency in this paper by letting nominals partially denote states in the original model
as well; an approach also taken in [7].
In addition to the question of how to combine Hybrid Logic and epistemic mod-
elling, there is the question of the usefulness of Hybrid Logic in epistemic modelling.
The usefulness is illustrated by modal logics for games, for instance. [11] introduces
a logic with modalities for preferences, knowledge, and intentions as well as the
global modality and nominals. It is shown that the notion of Nash equilibrium is
deﬁnable in this language and that nominals are necessary in this deﬁnition (see [11],
Fact 5.5.9). In [15] Nash equilibrium is also deﬁned using distributed knowledge,
preference modalities and nominals.
Hybrid Logic can also be used to clarify some of the implicit assumptions made
when modelling knowledge by Kripke semantics. For instance @iϕ → Ka@iϕ is a
validity expressing that if ϕ is true at a state (named by i), then agent a knows this.
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Furthermore, if the state named by j is accessible from the state named by i all
the agents know this, i.e. @iKˆaj → Kb@iKˆaj is valid. Thus the hybrid machinery
clariﬁes the implicit assumption that all the agents know what the model looks like.
Uncertainty only comes from the fact that they do not necessarily know in which
state of the model they are in.
For a hybrid epistemic logic with the downarrow binder ↓x. 3 we can express
that an agent knows all the (relevant) facts at a given state without specifying what
they are. The formula ↓x.Kax thus expresses that agent a is completely informed
in the current state. This cannot be expressed in basic Epistemic Logic if there are
inﬁnitely many propositional symbols, nor if the intended model is inﬁnite. Imagine
a scenario where agent a writes down a natural number (potentially any natural
number) and agent b does not see which number. A Kripke model of this scenario
will consist of all the natural numbers corresponding to all the possible numbers
a could write down. Expressing in classical epistemic logic that agent b knows
that a knows what number he writes down would require an inﬁnite disjunction
(Kb(Ka0∨Ka1∨Ka2∨ ...)), where in hybrid logic the formula Kb ↓x.Kax does the
trick.
The main focus of this paper is another advantage of introducing hybrid
machinery into PAL. From a proof theoretical point of view classical Hybrid Logic
ﬁxes a great deal of the problems of classical modal logic. In the case of PAL
the proof theory also becomes much nicer when we move to a hybrid version, as
already demonstrated by the paper [7].
The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2 Hybrid Logic with
partially denoting nominals is introduced and axiomatized. Next, a hybrid version
of PAL is presented, and a sound and complete axiomatization is given (section
3). In section 4 we add distributed knowledge to the logic. In the process it is
also shown that distributed knowledge can be deﬁned using satisfaction operators
and the downarrow binder. Finally, concluding remarks and further directions of
research are given in section 5. Some of the proofs are left out but can be found in
[8].
2 A hybrid logic with partial denoting nominals
The basic idea behind letting nominals partially denote states is that they are true
in at most one state instead of exactly one state. But problems arise with the
formula @iϕ, stating that ϕ is true at the state denoted by i. If the nominal i does
not denote a state, what should the truth value of @iϕ be? There seems to be only
two obvious answers, either @iϕ is true in all states or it is false in all states.
4
We choose the ﬁrst and thus take the formula @iϕ to be true if the nominal i
denotes a state and ϕ is true there. The dual operator of @i, denoted by @i (i.e.
3 The intuition behind the operator ↓x. is that it names the current state x and by doing so it allows us to
return to the state later on.
4 If i does not denote any states in a model it does not point out anything else than the empty set, thus it
seems only fair to make @iϕ true in the entire model or false in the entire model independent of ϕ.
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@iϕ := ¬@i¬ϕ), then corresponds to the second choice. The two choices for @iϕ
make the logic diﬀer from classical hybrid logic, since @ is no longer self-dual. We
will also add the global modality E to the language, where Eϕ is interpreted as
“there is some state in the model where ϕ is true”. Since the semantics of this
operator do not depend on the nominals, no problem arises by adding this. When
adding the modalities E and A (A being the dual of E), the choice of the semantics
for @iϕ can be seen as the choice between making @iϕ equivalent to E(i ∧ ϕ) or
A(i → ϕ). When nominals only partially denote states these two formulas are no
longer equivalent. Since we will have that @iϕ is equivalent to E(i ∧ ϕ) and @iϕ is
equivalent to A(i → ϕ), we see that the satisfaction operator has been split into an
existential modality @i and a universal modality @i. Besides the global modality
we will also add the downarrow binder. Thus we add formulas of the form ↓x.ϕ
to the language, having the intuitive reading “naming the current state x makes ϕ
true”. In adding ↓x., we also allow x and @xϕ to occur as formulas and we are
thus faced with the same problems of denotation. However now the denotation of
a state variable as x is taken care of by assignments and not by the model. Hence
we now have to allow partial functions as assignments.
2.1 Syntax and semantics
To deﬁne the language, we assume a set of propositional variables PROP, a countable
inﬁnite set of nominals NOM, and a countable inﬁnite set of state variables SVAR.
Since the enterprise is Epistemic Logic, we will denote the modal box operators by
Ka, where a is an agent from a ﬁnite set A of agents.
Deﬁnition 2.1 The syntax of the full language of Hybrid Logic with Partially
Denoting Nominals, denoted by PH(@, ↓, E), is given by
ϕ ::= p | u | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Kaϕ | @uϕ | ↓x.ϕ | Eϕ,
where p ∈ PROP, u ∈ NOM ∪ SVAR, x ∈ SVAR and a ∈ A. 5
We will also be interested in sub-languages of this full language. The language
without the global modality E will be denoted by PH(@, ↓) and if we also omit the
downarrow binder (and thus also omit the cases for the state variable x) we will
denote the language by PH(@). Finally this language added the global modality
will be denoted by PH(@, E). 6 Furthermore we will use the following abbreviations
of @i for ¬@i¬ and Kˆa for ¬Ka¬.
These languages do not diﬀer from classical Hybrid Logic in the syntax, but
their semantics diﬀer. The notion of a frame is the usual one; a frame is a pair
〈W, (Ra)a∈A〉 such that Ra is a binary relation on the non-empty set W . 7 Given a
5 In the following we will use i, j, k to range over nominals, x, y to range over state variables, and u, s, t to
range over both nominals and state variables.
6 As usual in hybrid logic @iϕ can be deﬁned as E(i ∧ ϕ), thus the @i operators are superﬂuous when we
have E. Still, we prefer to keep the @i operators in the language to make the forthcoming axiomatization
more uniform and easier to read.
7 Note that we do not require that Ra is an equivalence relation as usually done in epistemic logic. However,
this requirement can easily be added and will be discussed later on.
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frame we can build a model upon it and deﬁne truth relative to it.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Given a frame 〈W, (Ra)a∈A〉, a model based upon it is a tuple
M = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉, such that V : PROP∪NOM → P(W ) satisﬁes that |V (i)| ≤ 1,
for all i ∈ NOM. An assignment in M is a partial function g : SVAR → W . (By
“x ∈ dom(g)” we will denote that x is in the domain of the partial function g.)
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let M = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉 be a model, w ∈ W and g an assignment
in M. The semantics of ϕ is inductively deﬁned by:
M, w, g |= p iﬀ w ∈ V (p);
M, w, g |= i iﬀ w ∈ V (i);
M, w, g |= x iﬀ x ∈ dom(g) and g(x) = w;
M, w, g |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ;
M, w, g |= ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ and M, w, g |= ψ;
M, w, g |= Kaϕ iﬀ for all v ∈ W , if wRav then M, v, g |= ϕ;
M, w, g |= @iϕ iﬀ there is a v ∈ V (i) s.t. M, v, g |= ϕ;
M, w, g |= @xϕ iﬀ x ∈ dom(g) and M, g(x), g |= ϕ;
M, w, g |=↓x.ϕ iﬀ M, w, g′ |= ϕ, where g′ is as g besides that g′(x) = w;
M, w, g |= Eϕ iﬀ there is a v ∈ W s.t. M, v, g |= ϕ.
The logic of this semantics will be denoted by KPH(@,↓,E) (and similar for the
sublanguages). The notions of satisﬁability and validity are deﬁned as usual. Note,
that if we have a language without the downarrow binder, we do not need assign-
ments, and we will simply omit them.
Some classical validities of Hybrid Logic fail in this new semantics. For instance
the formula @ii is no longer valid. Furthermore @i@jϕ is no longer equivalent to
@jϕ, however, @i@jϕ → @jϕ remains valid. As already mentioned, self-duality
of @ also fails, and this makes the validity ¬@iϕ ↔ @i¬ϕ fail. @i¬ϕ → ¬@iϕ is
valid though and so is @iϕ → ¬@i¬ϕ, which can been seen as expressing that the
satisfaction operator @i is functional.
Even though KPH(@,↓,E) is diﬀerent from classical Hybrid Logic, we can recover
a version of classical Hybrid Logic withinKPH(@,↓,E). Note that, the formula @ii (or
equivalent Ei) is true exactly when the nominal i denotes a state. Thus putting @ii
as an antecedent to classical hybrid validities will yield validities in KPH(@,↓,E), for
instance the formulas @ii → (@jϕ ↔ @i@jϕ), @ii → (@iϕ ↔ ¬@i¬ϕ), and @ii →(
E(i ∧ ϕ) ↔ A(i → ϕ)) becomes valid. Note also that all classical Hybrid Logic
models are models for KPH(@,↓,E), thus all validities of KPH(@,↓,E) are validities of
classical Hybrid Logic.
The validities and equivalences just discussed are used in most proof systems for
Hybrid Logic, thus to give a proof system for Hybrid Logic with Partial Denoting
Nominals, diﬀerent axioms and rules are required.
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2.2 Complete proof systems
We will now give Hilbert-style proof systems for the hybrid logics with partially
denoting nominals. We will start by discussing the logic with nominals, satisfaction
operators, and downarrow binders KPH(@,↓) and completeness for this. Complete-
ness of the logic KPH(@) can be obtained in a similar manner. Finally we brieﬂy
discuss how the global modality can be added as well as how completeness with
respect to other classes of frames can be obtained.
The proof systems is shown in ﬁgure 1 and follow those of [4] and [1] with
some modiﬁcations. Existing axioms and rules have been modiﬁed to cope with the
partially denoting nominals and these have also caused two new axioms to be add
(Denote and Collapse). 8 Note that we are working in a multi-modal language with
a modality Ka for each a ∈ A and thus for axioms and rules involving Ka we have
one axiom/rule for each a ∈ A.
We use standard terminology for Hilbert-style proof systems. A proof of ϕ
in KPH(−) (“−” denotes any combination of @, ↓, and E) is a ﬁnite sequence of
formulas ending with ϕ such that every formula in the sequence is either an axiom
of KPH(−) or follows from previous formulas in the sequence using one of the proof
rules. We denote this by KPH(−) ϕ. For a set of formulas Γ, Γ KPH(−) ϕ holds
if there are ψ1, ..., ψn ∈ Γ such that KPH(−) ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψn → ϕ. Given a set of
formulas Σ, let KPH(−) + Σ denote the logic obtained from KPH(−) by adding all
the formulas in Σ as axioms. That ϕ is provable in the logic KPH(−) + Σ will be
denoted by KPH(−)+Σ ϕ. A set of formulas Γ is said to be KPH(−)+Σ-inconsistent
if Γ KPH(−)+Σ ⊥, and KPH(−) + Σ-consistent otherwise. A formula ϕ is pure if it
does not contain any propositional variables or state variables. A set of formulas Σ
is called substitution-closed, if it is closed under uniform substitution of nominals
by nominals. 9
2.2.1 The completeness proof for KPH(@,↓)
We start out by stating a Lindenbaum lemma.
Lemma 2.4 (Lindenbaum lemma) Let Σ be a set of pure PH(@, ↓)-formulas.
Every KPH(@,↓) + Σ-consistent set of formulas Γ can be extended to a maximal
KPH(@,↓) + Σ-consistent set Γ+ (in a new language obtained by adding countable
many new nominals), such that
(1) Γ+ contains a nominal.
(2) For all @uKˆaϕ ∈ Γ+ there is a nominal j, s.t. @uKˆaj ∈ Γ+ and @jϕ ∈ Γ+.
Proof. This is standard just using the modiﬁed rules, see [4] or [1]. 
8 Additionally, contrary to [4], we have left out a substitution rule. The reason is that the validities of
PAL are not closed under substitution ([p]p is a validity for all propositional variables p, but [ϕ]ϕ is not a
validity for arbitrary formulas ϕ.) and thus when we want to add the public announcement machinery we
cannot have a substitution rule.
9 For instance, if Σ is substitution-closed and @i(p → (j ∧Kaj)) ∈ Σ then also @k(p → (l ∧Kal)) ∈ Σ for
all nominals k and l.
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Axioms for KPH(@,↓):
All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
Ka(ϕ → ψ) → (Kaϕ → Kaψ) K
@u(ϕ → ψ) → (@uϕ → @uψ) K@
@uϕ → @uϕ @-functional
@uu Weak-reﬂexivity
@u@sϕ → @sϕ Weak-agree
u → (ϕ ↔ @uϕ) Introduction
Kˆa@uϕ → @uϕ Back
(@uKˆas ∧@sϕ) → @uKˆaϕ Bridge
@uϕ → @uu Denote
@uu → (@uϕ → @uϕ) Collapse
@u(↓x.ϕ ↔ ϕ[x := u])1 DA
Rules for KPH(@,↓):
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ, infer ψ Modus ponens
From ϕ, infer Kaϕ Necessitation of 
From ϕ, infer @uϕ Necessitation of @
From @uϕ, where u does not occur in ϕ, infer ϕ Name
From (@uKˆas ∧@sϕ) → ψ, where u = s and s
does not occur in ϕ or ψ, infer @uKˆaϕ → ψ Paste
Extra axioms for KPH(E,−):
@ii → Ei, (for all i ∈ NOM) GM
1 ϕ[x := u] denotes the formula obtained from ϕ by substituting all free occurrences of x by u.
Fig. 1. The Hilbert-style proof systems for KPH(@) and its extensions.
We can now construct a Henkin-style model from maximal consistent sets with
the help of the following lemma, which is easy to prove.
Lemma 2.5 The following are derivable in the logic KPH(@,↓):
i) @us → (@uϕ ↔ @uϕ)
ii) @us → @su
iii) (@uu ∧@ss) → (@sϕ ↔ @u@sϕ)
iv) @us → (@uϕ ↔ @sϕ)
v) (@us ∧@st) → @ut
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of PH(@, ↓)-formulas. Deﬁne
NΓ = {u ∈ NOM ∪ SVAR | @uu ∈ Γ} and an equivalence relation ∼ on NΓ by:
u ∼ s iﬀ @us ∈ Γ (and denote the equivalence class of u by |u|). Then the canonical
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model MΓ = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉 and the canonical assignment gΓ are deﬁned by
W = {|u| | u ∈ NΓ};
|u|Ra|s| iﬀ @uKˆas ∈ Γ for all a ∈ A;
V (p) = {|u| ∈ W | @up ∈ Γ} for all p ∈ PROP;
V (j) = {|u| ∈ W | @uj ∈ Γ} for all j ∈ NOM;
gΓ(x) = |x| for all x ∈ SVAR ∩NΓ.
A few comments about why this is well-deﬁned are in order. First of all note
that by the Denote rule and ii) of lemma 2.5, if @us ∈ Γ then u, s ∈ NΓ. That the
relation ∼ is an equivalence relation (and thus W is well-deﬁned) follows from the
construction of NΓ and ii) and v) of lemma 2.5. That Ra is well-deﬁned follows from
iv) of lemma 2.5 and the Bridge axiom. Finally that V is well-deﬁned for p ∈ PROP
follows from iv) of lemma 2.5, and for i ∈ NOM by ∼ being an equivalence relation.
∼ being an equivalence relation also guaranties that gΓ is a well-deﬁned assignment.
Note that if @ii /∈ Γ then V (i) = ∅ and thus i does not denote. Similar for state
variables.
An essential part of the completeness proof is the following truth lemma:
Lemma 2.7 (Truth lemma) Let Γ be a maximal consistent set of PH(@, ↓)-
formulas satisfying item (2) of the Lindenbaum lemma. Then for all u ∈ NΓ and
all PH(@, ↓)-formulas ϕ
MΓ, |u|, gΓ |= ϕ iﬀ @uϕ ∈ Γ. (1)
Proof. The proof goes by induction on ϕ. When ϕ is a p or j for a p ∈ PROP or
j ∈ NOM, (1) follows directly from the deﬁnition of V . When ϕ is on the form x
for a x ∈ SVAR, (1) follows from ∼ being an equivalence relation.
The induction step. If ϕ is on the form ψ ∧ χ or ¬ψ, the proof is easy. Assume
now that ϕ has the form @sψ. Note that if @u@sψ ∈ Γ then @sψ ∈ Γ by weak-agree
and thus s ∈ NΓ by Denote. Then by induction it follows that MΓ, |s|, gΓ |= ψ,
which again implies that MΓ, |u|, gΓ |= @sψ. If MΓ, |u|, gΓ |= @sψ then there is a
s′ ∈ NΓ such that MΓ, |s′|, gΓ |= ψ and V (s) = |s′| if s is a nominal and gΓ(s) = |s′|
if s is a state variable. By the deﬁnition of V and gΓ this implies that @s′s ∈ Γ and
by the induction hypothesis that @s′ψ ∈ Γ. But now it follows from iv) of lemma
2.5 that @sψ ∈ Γ. From the assumption about i and @s′s ∈ Γ and lemma 2.5 ii)
and Denote it follows that @uu,@ss ∈ Γ. But then by iii) of lemma 2.5, @u@sψ ∈ Γ
follows.
The case ϕ is of the form Kˆaψ. If MΓ, |u|, gΓ |= Kˆaψ, then there is a s ∈ NΓ
such that |u|Ra|s| and MΓ, |s|, gΓ |= ψ. By deﬁnition of Ra, @uKˆas ∈ Γ and by
the induction hypothesis @sψ ∈ Γ. But then by the bridge axiom it follows that
@uKˆaψ ∈ Γ. Now assume that @uKˆaψ ∈ Γ. Then since Γ satisﬁes item (2) of the
Lindenbaum lemma it follows that there is a nominal j such that @uKˆaj ∈ Γ and
@jψ ∈ Γ. Note that by Denote j ∈ NΓ. Now by the deﬁnition of Ra and V and the
induction hypothesis it follows that MΓ, |u|, gΓ |= Kˆaψ.
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Finally for the case where ϕ is of the form ↓x.ψ. First note that MΓ, |u|, gΓ |=↓
x.ψ if and only ifMΓ, |u|, gΓ |= ψ[x := u] due to a substitution lemma that can easily
be proven. 10 But then by the induction hypothesis it follows thatMΓ, |u|, gΓ |=↓x.ψ
if and only if @uψ[x := u] ∈ Γ. And ﬁnally by the DA axiom it follows that
MΓ, |u|, gΓ |=↓x.ψ if and only if @u ↓x.ψ ∈ Γ. This concludes the proof. 
A frame F validates a set of formulas Σ, if M |= Σ for all models M based on
F . With this notion we state a Frame lemma:
Lemma 2.8 (Frame lemma) Let Σ be a substitution-closed set of pure PH(@, ↓)-
formulas and let Γ be a KPH(@,↓)+Σ maximal consistent set of PH(@, ↓)-formulas
satisfying item (1) and (2) of the Lindenbaum lemma. Then the underlying frame
of MΓ validates all the formulas in Σ.
Proof. See Lemma 7.1 of [2]. 
We are now ﬁnally capable of proving the completeness theorem.
Theorem 2.9 (Completeness of KPH(@,↓)) Let Σ be a substitution-closed set of
pure PH(@, ↓)-formulas. Every set of PH(@, ↓)-formulas that is KPH(@,↓) + Σ-
consistent is satisﬁable in a model whose underlying frame validates all the formulas
in Σ.
Proof. Assume that Γ is KPH(@,↓) + Σ-consistent. Then it can be extended to a
maximal KPH(@,↓)+Σ-consistent set Γ+ by the Lindenbaum lemma. Since there is
a nominal i ∈ Γ+ by item (1) of the Lindenbaum lemma it is easy to see that for
all ϕ ∈ Γ, @iϕ ∈ Γ+ by the Introduction axiom. But then by the truth lemma it
follows that MΓ+ , |i|, gΓ+ |= Γ. By the frame lemma the underlying frame of MΓ+
validates all the formulas in Σ and we are done. 
2.2.2 Completeness for KPH(@,E,−) and with respect to other frame classes
In the case of completeness with respect to the global modality E, we once more
follow the lines of [4]. We take one of the modalities in our multi-modal logic to be
E 11 and add the axiom GM of ﬁgure 1. To see why this suﬃces, note that E is just a
normal modal operator for which the intended accessibility relation is the universal
relation on the domain. The formula @ii → Ei is a pure formula, so adding all
substitution instances, as in the axiom GM, automatically gives completeness with
respect to the class of frames @ii → Ei deﬁnes. Hence, all that is left to notice
is that @ii → Ei deﬁnes the universal relation on the domain. However, this can
easily be proven and we obtain:
Theorem 2.10 (Completeness of KPH(@,E,−)) Let Σ be a substitution-closed
set of pure PH(@, E,−)-formulas. Every set of PH(@, E,−)-formulas that is
10Let Int(u) stand for g(u) if u is a state variable and V (u) if u is a nominal. Then the substitution lemma
can be stated as: Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model, ϕ a formula, and u ∈ SVAR∪NOM. Then for all w ∈ W
and all assignments g with g(x) = Int(u): M, w, g |= ϕ iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ[x := u].
11Elaborated, we add an extra agent e to A and write E instead of Kˆe. Thus, in the proof system we also
include all the axioms and rules from ﬁgure 1 involving Ka, for E.
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KPH(@,E,−) + Σ-consistent is satisﬁable in a model whose underlying frame vali-
dates all the formulas in Σ.
In Epistemic Logic one usually wants to put extra conditions on the relations
Ra, for instance transitivity, reﬂexivity, and euclideaness. The logic obtained by
requiring all these properties will be denoted S5PH(−) and if only transitivity and
reﬂexivity are required, the logic will be denoted by S4PH(−). When modal logic
is used to reason about beliefs, one usually replaces the reﬂexivity requirement of
S5PH(−) by requiring seriality of Ra instead, and the logic obtained in this way
will be denoted KD45PH(−). Now if one wants to work with these logics instead
of just KPH(−), complete Hilbert-style proof systems can easily be obtained from
theorems 2.9 and 2.10, since all the properties can be deﬁned by pure formulas.
i → Kˆai deﬁnes reﬂexivity, KˆaKˆai → Kˆai deﬁnes transitivity, Kˆai → KaKˆai deﬁnes
euclideaness, and Kˆa deﬁnes seriality, which is all well known in the Hybrid Logic
literature.
3 Hybrid Public Announcement Logic
We now combine Hybrid Logic with Partially Denoting Nominals with PAL. As
before we assume the sets PROP, NOM, SVAR and A. The full languageHPAL(@, ↓
, E) of the Hybrid Public Announcement Logic is given by:
ϕ ::= p | u | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Kaϕ | @uϕ | ↓x.ϕ | Eϕ | [ϕ]ψ,
where p ∈ PROP, u ∈ NOM ∪ SVAR, x ∈ SVAR, and a ∈ A. For the sub-languages
we will use the same conventions as before.
The notion of a model M = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉 is the same as for PH(@, ↓, E).
The deﬁnition of the semantic entailmentM, w, g |= ϕ is a combination of deﬁnition
2.3 for PH(@, ↓, E) and the following clause:
M, w, g |= [ϕ]ψ ⇐⇒ M, w, g |= ϕ implies that M|ϕ, w, gϕ |= ψ,
where the deﬁnition of the model M|ϕ = 〈W |ϕ, R|ϕ, V |ϕ〉 is:
W |ϕ = {v ∈ W | M, v, g |= ϕ}
Ra|ϕ = Ra ∩ (W |ϕ ×W |ϕ)
V |ϕ(p) = V (p) ∩W |ϕ
V |ϕ(i) = V (i) ∩W |ϕ,
and the assignment gϕ is obtained from g by restricting its domain to the set {x ∈
dom(g) | g(x) ∈ W |ϕ}.
The logic of this semantics will be called the full Hybrid Public Announcement
Logic and will be denoted by KHPAL(@,↓,E). Note that M|ϕ is just the model M
restricted to the states where ϕ is true. The problem of adding nominals to PAL now
becomes immediately clear: If a nominal i denotes a state where ϕ is not true, i does
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Axioms for KHPAL(@,↓,E):
All axioms for KPH(@,↓,E)
[ϕ] p ↔ (ϕ → p) Atomic permanence (propositions)
[ϕ]u ↔ (ϕ → u)1 Atomic permanence (states)
[ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ → ¬[ϕ]ψ) Announcement and negation
[ϕ] (ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ) Announcement and conjunction
[ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ → Ka[ϕ]ψ) Announcement and knowledge
[ϕ] [ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ Announcement composition
[ϕ] @uψ ↔ (ϕ → @u(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ))1 Announcement and satisfaction
[ϕ]↓x.ψ ↔↓x.[ϕ]ψ2 Announcement and downarrow
[ϕ]Eψ ↔ (ϕ → E(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ)) Announcement and global modality
Rules for KHPAL(@,↓,E):
All rules for KPH(@,↓,E)
1 Here u ∈ NOM ∪ SVAR. 2 Assuming that x does not occur in ϕ.
Fig. 2. The Hilbert-style proof system for KHPAL(@,↓,E).
not denote any state in the model M|ϕ. The problem arises for state variables as
well. This is the main reason for introducing Hybrid Logic with Partially Denoting
Nominals in this paper. 12
We will provide the logic with a Hilbert-style proof system and show complete-
ness in the usual way for PAL, i.e we will provide a truth-preserving translation from
KHPAL(@,↓,E) into KPH(@,↓,E). This is interesting in its own right, since it shows
that Hybrid Public Announcement Logic is not more expressive than the underlying
hybrid epistemic logic (which is also the case in standard PAL, see [16]). The proof
system is given in Figure 2 and is an extension of the one for KPH(@,↓,E) with ad-
ditional reduction axioms for the public announcement operator. These reduction
axioms are the usual ones from PAL plus new ones for the hybrid operators.
Moving a ↓x.-operator from within the scope of a [ϕ]-operator to the outside can
lead to accidental binding of x in [ϕ]. Hence the requirement in the Announcement
and downarrow axiom. However, this is not really a limitation because we can
always rename bound variables without changing the truth value of a formula.
When encountering a formula [ϕ]↓x.ψ where x appears in ϕ, we can replace all
occurrences of x in ψ by a new state variable y to get ψ′ and obtain an equivalent
formula [ϕ]↓y.ψ′, where y does not occur in ϕ. With this assumption the reduction
axiom for the downarrow binder is sound. The soundness of the reduction axioms
for the satisfaction operator, the global modality and the downarrow binder is stated
12There is another way of deﬁning the semantics for the public announcement operator [ϕ]. Instead of
removing states where ϕ is not true, one simply removes access to these states, i.e. restrict the accessibility
relations. In standard PAL these approaches are equivalent, but in Hybrid Logic using either satisfaction
operators or the global modality, we are capable of reaching states which are not accessible via the accessi-
bility relations and thus the two approaches diﬀer. However, this alternative approach has strange validities
involving the satisfaction operator and the global modality as consequence. For instance, it might be the
case that agent a does not know p at the state i before an announcement. But, after it is announced that
the actual state is not i it becomes true that @iKap. I.e. [¬i](@iϕ → @iKaϕ) would be valid in this
alternative approach, which seems contra intuitive.
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in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 The following holds for all HPAL(@, ↓, E) formulas ϕ and ψ:
1) [ϕ]@uψ is equivalent to ϕ → @u(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ).
2) [ϕ]Eψ is equivalent to ϕ → E(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ).
3) If the state variable x does not occur in the formula ϕ, then [ϕ]↓x.ψ is equivalent
to ↓x.[ϕ]ψ.
Proof. 1) Since 〈ϕ〉ψ and ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ are equivalent (as in standard PAL), one only
needs to show that [ϕ]@uψ is equivalent to ϕ → @u〈ϕ〉ψ. This is shown by the
following equivalences:
M, w, g |= [ϕ]@uψ
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ M|ϕ, w, gϕ |= @uψ
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ (∃v ∈ W |ϕ s.t. M|ϕ, v, gϕ |= u ∧M|ϕ, v, gϕ |= ψ)
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ (∃v ∈ W s.t. M, v, g |= ϕ ∧M, v, g |= u ∧M|ϕ, v, gϕ |= ψ)
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ (∃v ∈ W s.t. M, v, g |= u ∧M, v, g |= 〈ϕ〉ψ)
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ M, w, g |= @u〈ϕ〉ψ
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ → @u〈ϕ〉ψ
2) This is similar to 1.
3) Let a model M = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉, a state w ∈ W and an assignment g in
M be given. Let also formulas ϕ and ψ be given such that the state variable x does
not occur in ϕ. Note that since x does not occur in ϕ, for all assignments h and h′
such that they only diﬀers on x, M, w, h |= ϕ if and only if M, w, h′ |= ϕ (for all
models M and states w). We now have the following equivalences, where g′ is just
like g except that g′(x) = w and g′ϕ is just like gϕ except that g′ϕ(x) = w:
M, w, g |= [ϕ]↓x.ψ iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ M|ϕ, w, gϕ |=↓x.ψ
iﬀ M, w, g |= ϕ ⇒ M|ϕ, w, g′ϕ |= ψ
iﬀ M, w, g′ |= ϕ ⇒ M|ϕ, w, g′ϕ |= ψ
iﬀ M, w, g′ |= [ϕ]ψ
iﬀ M, w, g |=↓x.[ϕ]ψ,

The soundness of the proof system follows from the soundness of KPH(@,↓,E)
together with the soundness of the reduction axioms. For the completeness of
the proof system, we ﬁrst deﬁne a translation t : HPAL(@, ↓, E) → PH(@, ↓, E).
The translation uses the reduction axiom to translate away all public announce-
ment operators, for instance is t([ϕ]Kaψ) = t(ϕ → Ka[ϕ]ψ). On all other logical
connectives and operators t does nothing, for instance t(Kaϕ) = Kat(ϕ). In the
case of the downarrow binder a little more care has to be taken due to the be-
fore mentioned possibility of accidentally binding. In this case the translation is
t([ϕ]↓x.ψ) = t(↓x′.[ϕ](ψ[x := x′])), where x′ is a new state variable not occurring in
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ϕ or ψ. Note that the translation is not deﬁned inductively on the usual complexity
of a formula, for the public announcement operator we split into sub cases. There-
fore we cannot prove results regarding t by induction on usual formula complex-
ity. However, the complexity of the formula immediately succeeding the public an-
nouncement operator decreases trough the translation, and this we can use. A new
complexity measure c : HPAL(@, ↓, E) → N can be deﬁned such that c decreases
for every step of the translation, for instance c([ϕ]@iψ) > c(ϕ → @i(ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ)).
The details are omitted, see [16] or [9]. Using this complexity measure we can easily
prove that every formula of HPAL(@, ↓, E) is provably equivalent to its translation:
Lemma 3.2 For all HPAL(@, ↓, E) formulas ϕ,
KHPAL(@,↓,E) ϕ ↔ t(ϕ)
From this lemma together with soundness of the proof system, it follows that
all formulas is also semantically equivalent to their translation:
Lemma 3.3 For all HPAL(@, ↓, E) formulas ϕ, all models M = 〈W,R, V 〉, all
w ∈ W , and all assignments g,
M, w, g |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w, g |= t(ϕ)
Note that translating pure formulas from HPAL(@, ↓, E) results in pure formu-
las in PH(@, ↓, E). A general completeness result now follows:
Theorem 3.4 (Completeness for KHPAL(@,↓,E)) Let Σ be a substitution-closed
set of pure HPAL(@, ↓, E)-formulas. Every set of HPAL(@, ↓, E)-formulas that
is KHPAL(@,↓,E) + Σ-consistent is satisﬁable in a model whose underlying frame
validates all the formulas in Σ.
Proof. Assume that Γ isKHPAL(@,↓,E)+Σ-consistent. For a set ofHPAL(@, ↓, E)-
formulas X, let t(X) := {t(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ X}. Then t(Γ) is KPH(@,↓,E)+ t(Σ)-consistent,
for assume otherwise: Then there are ϕ1, ..., ϕn ∈ Γ such that KPH(@,↓,E)+t(Σ)
t(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn) → ⊥. But then also KHPAL(@,↓,E)+Σ t(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn) → ⊥ (using
lemma 3.2 on formulas in Σ) and by lemma 3.2, KHPAL(@,↓,E)+Σ ϕ1 ∧ ...∧ϕn → ⊥,
which is a contradiction to Γ being KHPAL(@,↓,E) +Σ-consistent. Now by theorem
2.9 t(Γ) is satisﬁable in a model M (which is also a model for HPAL(@, ↓, E)), and
by lemma 3.3 it follows that Γ is also satisﬁable in M.
Finally, for all pure formulas ϕ ∈ Σ, t(ϕ) is a pure formula. Thus by theorem
2.9 the underlying frame of M validates all of the formulas t(ϕ) ∈ t(Σ). But by
lemma 3.3 the underlying frame then also validates all ϕ ∈ Σ. 
We could have left out any of the operators ↓x., E and thus got completeness
for any of the weaker logics. Theorem 3.4 also provides completeness with respect
to other classes of frames deﬁned by pure formulas and thus we obtain public an-
nouncement logics such as S4HPAL(@,↓,E) and S5HPAL(@,↓,E).
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4 Adding distributed knowledge
Often notions of group knowledge are important when modeling knowledge in multi-
agent settings. Distributed knowledge is such a notion and we will add it to
KHPAL(−) in this section. In addition we will show that distributed knowledge
is deﬁnable using satisfaction operators and the downarrow binder.
To add distributed knowledge we add to the language a modal operator DB, for
every non-empty subset B ⊆ A. The semantics of DB is:
M, w, g |= DBϕ iﬀ for all v ∈ W ; if (w, v) ∈
⋂
b∈B Rb then M, v, g |= ϕ.
The dual operator of DB will be denoted by DˆB. Note that the semantics of DB
is given in term of intersection of relations, which in PDL is not modally deﬁnable
though it is axiomatizable. 13 However, with nominals intersection becomes easy to
modally deﬁne, and this we will use.
The standard way of extending PAL with new modalities begins with adding the
new modalities to the underlying epistemic logic and ﬁnding a complete axiomati-
zation of this combined logic. Then reduction axioms for the new modalities have
to be found and shown to be sound. In many cases, using the generality of theorem
3.4, we can shorten this process considerably and add new modalities directly to
KHPAL(−) without having to show completeness of the underlying logic and sound-
ness of new reduction axioms. We will demonstrate this by adding distributed
knowledge to KHPAL(−). This is done by adding pure formulas that completely
axiomatize distributed knowledge. The proof system of the logic KHPAL(−,D) is
shown in ﬁgure 3.
Axioms for KHPAL(−,D):
All the axioms for KHPAL(−)
All the axioms of KHPAL(−) involving Ka, with Ka replaced by DB
(for every ∅ = B ⊆ A)
DˆBi ↔
∧
b∈B Kˆbi, (for all i ∈ NOM and all ∅ = B ⊆ A) DK
Rules for KHPAL(−,D):
All the rules for KHPAL(−)
All the rules of KHPAL(−) involving Ka, with Ka replaced by DB
(for every ∅ = B ⊆ A)
Fig. 3. The alternative Hilbert-style proof system for KPH(−,D).
This approach is similar to one used for adding the global modality toKPH(@,−).
We have to make sure that the pure formulas (DK) deﬁnes the right class of frames,
i.e. frames for which RB =
⋂
b∈B Rb. However, there is a little more subtleness to
13There is no axiom that for all frames 〈W,R1, R2, R3〉 can force R1 = R2 ∩ R3, see for instance [10].
However the logic obtained by adding distributed knowledge, interpreted as intersection, to epistemic logic
can be axiomatized, see for instance [6].
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this than in the case of KPH(−). Theorem 3.4 only insures that the axioms DK
becomes valid in the underlying frame of MΓ and not necessarily in all subframes
of that frame. However if a frame satisﬁes that RB =
⋂
b∈B Rb then all subframes
also satisfy this property, and we have:
Lemma 4.1 DˆBi ↔
∧
b∈B Kˆbi is valid on a frame 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, (RB)B =∅,B⊆A〉 if
and only if RB =
⋂
b∈B Rb holds in the frame and all subframes.
Thus we obtain completeness of the system of ﬁgure 3 from theorem 3.4:
Theorem 4.2 (Completeness for KHPAL(−,D)) Let Σ be a set of pure
HPAL(−, D)-formulas. Every set of HPAL(−, D)-formulas that is
KHPAL(−,D) + Σ-consistent is satisﬁable in a model whose underlying frame
validates all the formulas in Σ.
To see that this is a real issue for completeness, look at the modality [a; b] deﬁned
by:
M, w, g |= [a; b]ϕ iﬀ for all v ∈ W ; if (w, v) ∈ Ra;Rb then M, v, g |= ϕ,
where Ra;Rb denotes the composition of the relations Ra and Rb deﬁned by Ra;Rb =
{(x, y) | ∃z : (x, z) ∈ Ra∧ (z, y) ∈ Rb}. In classical Hybrid Logic this is deﬁnable by
the pure axiom 〈a; b〉i ↔ 〈a〉〈b〉i. This axiom is easily seen to be valid exactly on the
class of frames where Ra;b = Ra;Rb. However, just because Ra;b = Ra;Rb holds on
a frame, does not necessarily imply that it also holds on all subframes. 14 Thus in
the scope of a public announcement operator [ϕ] the modality [a; b] will change its
meaning in the sense that it does not necessarily quantify over the composition of
the relations Ra and Rb anymore. The problem lies in the fact that composition is
not an operation that is preserved when going to submodels contrary to intersection.
4.1 The deﬁnability of distributed knowledge using satisfaction operators and the
downarrow binder
In the case of the logics KPH(@,↓,−) (or KHPAL(@,↓,−)) it turns out that distributed
knowledge is locally deﬁnable:
Proposition 4.3 Let B ⊆ A contain at least 2 elements 15 , let a ∈ B, let ϕ be a
PH(@, ↓,−)-formula and let x and y be diﬀerent state variables that do not occur
in ϕ. Then for all models M = 〈W, (Ra)a∈A, V 〉, all assignments g in M and all
w ∈ W :
M, w, g |= DBϕ iﬀ M, w, g |= ↓x.Ka ↓y.
(
@x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
)
.
14Take for instance the frame 〈W,Ra, Rb, Ra;b〉, where W = {x, y, z}, Ra = {(x, y)}, Rb = {(y, z)} and
Ra;b = {(x, z)}. This frame satisﬁes that Ra;b = Ra;Rb, but in the subframe only containing the states x
and z, we still have (x, z) ∈ Ra;b although (x, z) /∈ Ra;Rb.
15 If B only contains b then clearly DB is deﬁnable as Kb.
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Proof. The proof is given by the following equivalences, where g′ is just like g
except that g′(x) = w and g′′ is just like g′ except that g′′(y) = v (thus g′′ is just
like g except that g′′(x) = w and g′′(y) = v):
M, w, g |=↓x.Ka ↓y.
(
@x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
)
iﬀ M, w, g′ |= Ka ↓y.
(
@x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
)
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W
[
wRav ⇒ M, v, g′ |=↓y.
(
@x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
)]
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W
[
wRav ⇒ M, v, g′′ |= @x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
]
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W
[
wRav ⇒
[
M, w, g′′ |= ∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby ⇒ M, v, g′′ |= ϕ
]]
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W [wRav ⇒ [∀b ∈ B\{a} ∃s ∈ W (wRbs and M, s, g′′ |= y)
⇒ M, v, g′′ |= ϕ]]
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W [wRav ⇒ [∀b ∈ B\{a} ∃s ∈ W (wRbs and s = v)
⇒ M, v, g′′ |= ϕ]]
iﬀ∗ ∀v ∈ W [∀b ∈ B(wRbv) ⇒ M, v, g′′ |= ϕ]
iﬀ ∀v ∈ W [∀b ∈ B(wRbv) ⇒ M, v, g |= ϕ]
iﬀ M, w, g |= DBϕ,
where we in “iﬀ∗” have used that x and y do not occur in ϕ. 
Thus when adding distributed knowledge to the logic KHPAL(@,↓,−) we can
simply take the formula DBϕ to be an abbreviation for the formula ↓ x.Ka ↓
y.
(
@x(∧b∈B\{a}Kˆby) → ϕ
)
. Furthermore, as a corollary, adding distributed knowl-
edge does not add to the expressive power of KPH(@,↓,−) or KHPAL(@,↓,−):
Corollary 4.4 The logics KPH(@,↓,−) (KHPAL(@,↓,−)) and KPH(@,↓,D,−)
(KHPAL(@,↓,D,−)) are equally expressive.
5 Conclusion and further work
In this paper it has been shown that nominals, satisfaction operators, the downar-
row binder, the global modality, and distributed knowledge can be added to Public
Announcement Logic. Furthermore general completeness results for extensions with
pure formulas, a well celebrated result in Hybrid Logic, also transfer to the case of
Hybrid Public Announcement Logic. The completeness is shown using reduction
axioms as in classical PAL. Hence the public announcement operator does not in-
crease the expressive power when added to Hybrid Logic. Using the terminology of
[14], classical Hybrid Logic is not closed under relativization because nominals might
lose their references in submodels, but relaxing Hybrid Logic to a logic with only
partially denoting nominals, Hybrid Logic does become closed under relativization.
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The fact that the nice properties of Hybrid Logic are preserved in the combina-
tion with PAL adds signiﬁcantly to the proof theory of PAL. We have demonstrated
this by adding distributed knowledge via pure formulas. It was also noted that
adding modalities by pure formulas is a little more subtle than in classical Hybrid
Logic, due to the fact that some operations, such as composition, is not preserved
when going to submodels. This can be put more formally in a general framework
(see [8]). Finally it was shown that distributed knowledge could actually be deﬁned
using satisfaction operators and the downarrow binder. That Hybrid Logic has
much to oﬀer the proof theory of PAL is also demonstrated by the tableau system
developed in [7], but surely there is still much more that Hybrid Logic can oﬀer to
the proof theory of PAL. This is left for future research.
Another line of further research is to add common knowledge to the Hybrid
Public Announcement Logic. The question of extending the logic from Public An-
nouncement Logic to full Dynamic Epistemic Logic is left for further research as
well. The problem here is that in full Dynamic Epistemic Logic there are epistemic
actions that can expand a state into several states, and thus it is not clear anymore
what nominals should denote.
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